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BOOK REVIEW
Freedman, Monroe. CASES ON CONTRACTS. Washington, D. C.: Lerner
Law Book Co., 1967. Pp. xx, 1108. $15.00.
The first edition of a casebook offers the reviewer a conceptual scheme
for the presentation of the course materials. The reviewer can only guess
as to whether the organization developed and the cases and notes chosen
will withstand the savage onslaught of eager and questioning minds in
the guerilla warfare of classroom education. The second edition of a
casebook, however, presents the reviewer with the opportunity to evaluate
the practical application of the materials, both in the selection of items
to be studied and in the pedagogical arrangement of them. For, in the
last analysis, it is only in the smithy of lecture hall bantering that the
worth of a casebook either shines brightly through the mire or becomes
indistinguishable from it. A casebook is, after all, merely an educator's
tool for the presentation and inculcation of knowledge and therefore the
test chosen must be a pragmatic one--does it work? A second edition
purports to verify or refute the author's original guess as to the value of
the materials he has assembled.
Professor Freedman's new edition differs little from its predecessor.
Implicit in this fact is the author's determination that the book has
"worked." I had the privilege of being a member of the first class to use
the first edition and in my opinion it worked then. It is not strange,
therefore, that in the four years of its existence, the book has remained
substantially intact as originally conceived. Before noting the changes
made in the new edition, it might be useful to explore why the book
"worked" in -the first place.
The year 1947 marks a turning point in the development of Contracts
casebooks, and perhaps in the development of casebooks in all subjects.
It was in that year that Fuller published his monumental Basic Contract
Law. Fuller's innovation, when viewed from today's perspective, seems
minor; and that is the mark of a truly great idea. Fuller took what tradi-
tionally was considered to be the last chapter in Contracts books, Reme-
dies, and placed it at the beginning. The name was changed from "Reme-
dies" to "The General Scope of the Legal Protection Accorded Contracts,"
and a whole new approach to the law of Contracts was born.'
1 The Fuller innovation seems minor today because it has almost become commonplace for
books to begin with the chapter on Remedies. This idea is carried to the extreme in J. DAWSON
& W. HARvEY, CoNnAcrs AND CoNRmAcrs REMEIEs (1959) where the materials on Rem-
edies cover 297 pages.
Commonwealth casebooks as a rule stick to the traditional arrangement. See R. McGAR-
VIE, C. PANNAM & P. HOCER, CASES AND MATmIALS ON CoNmAcr (1966); J. Smirm
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Replacing the doctrinal arrangement which spun out the law chrono-
logically, Fuller's approach made Contracts a functionally taught course.
Besides presenting the law as it probably will appear to the lawyer in his
office as the client walks in the door, a functional arrangement serves to
unify the entire course by presenting a viewpoint or perspective from
which to develop the succeeding topics. Chronological organization,
though orderly and perhaps logical, tends to be without design. Time
itself can be accidental and without purpose, and so too must materials
which are organized to follow its dictates. A functional approach, how-
ever, offers the advantage of an idea or concept which serves as the focal
point for the development of all the materials. Not only does the student
absorb the essential elements of a subject, he additionally learns them in
conjunction with a philosophy of the course.
All Contracts casebooks present essentially the same materials-offer,
acceptance, consideration, remedies, etc.-but the crucial question in judg-
ing any casebook is: does the author present a philosophy of the course,
or a perspective for developing the course, which is a significant one in
terms of the education of the student in the law? This is not to say that
there is only one "best" perspective but rather that of the many available
ones, only a few may be said to be educationally worthwhile. In this
regard, the Fuller book is disappointing. After the original insight of
placing the cases on Remedies first, the book appears to revert to the tra-
ditional chronological development. The cases chosen are almost uni-
formly excellent and challenging, and Fuller's notes which appear
throughout are highly informative; but something is lacking. The ma-
terials are jumpy and do not tie together as cohesively as one would like.
This cohesive organization is the great attraction of the Freedman book.
It may also be said to be its downfall.
Freedman, in arranging his cases, made one crucial editorial decision.
That decision was to compile a book which must be taught and not merely
read. In the final analysis, the worth of the Freedman book must be
judged by the ability of the instructor who teaches from it." The book
& J. THOMAS, A CASEBOOK ON CONTRACT (3rd ed. 1966). One notable exception is J. MIL-
NER, CASES AND MATERiALS ON CONTRAcr (1963) which starts with Remedies and then
deals with Consideration.
Many American casebooks retain the old chronological development of the law. See H.
JONES, E. FARNswORT, & W. YOUNG, CONTRAcrs (1965) (The Remedies chapter, how-
ever, is moved up to precede chapters on Conditions, Assignments, Third Party Beneficiaries,
and Discharge); H. SHEPHERD & H. WELLINGTON, CONTRAcTS AND CONTRACT REMEDIES
(1957).
1 Freedman's book is difficult to teach from because it requires a great deal of creativity
on the instructor's part. It is a very challenging book because the emphasis is upon classroom
discussion in the form of hypotheticals to fill in'the nuances of contract law. Freedman's book
is designed for the student to be shown in class how to conjure up his own hypotheticals and
thus fill in the analytical links behind the selection of the cases. The student learns early that
[Vol. 56: 407408
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does not purport to be a hornbook on the law of Contracts, as some case-
books aspire to be. The materials are almost exclusively cases with some
notes added to serve as introductory material or as hints gleaned from
Professor Freedman's practice of the law. It is with the cases, however,
that the student will be expected to learn the law of Contracts.
Freedman has chosen his cases well. In fact, he has chosen them
with particular care since his purpose in putting together the materials
was not merely to collect the leading decisions, the odd decisions, and the
informative though perhaps tangential decisions, but rather to select the
particular case which follows the cases already selected to precede it. The
student using this book will not learn all the nuances of Contract law but
he will learn how to think them through. The emphasis on reasoning
is very heavy in Freedman's book and he has accomplished his purpose
in a very satisfying way. His book is about one-third shorter than stand-
ard casebooks but it has far more depth. Freedman has trimmed the fat
out of Contract law and has honed it down to its bare essentials.
Left with the "guts" of the course, Freedman chose his cases carefully
to bring out these essentials without unnecessary duplication. Thus, the
first chapter, as in Fuller's book, starts out with cases designed to explore
the question-what is a contract? The case chosen to begin the course,
Shaheen v. Knight,2 is a marvelous vehicle for bringing out most of the
major threads which by the end of the book Freedman has carefully
woven into the garment of Contracts. The case involves a doctor's failure
to sterilize his patient, the plaintiff, as per their contractual arrangement.
The suit is in contract and the measure of recovery sought is the expense
of rearing the unwanted child until its majority. The court decided that
it would be against public policy to allow a man the joy of raising his
child coupled with the added joy of having someone else foot the bills.
The contract itself was held not to be against public policy. Just a few
of the questions which this case suggests are: What is the relation between
right, duty, and remedy? Was the proper remedy sought in this case?
If not, what should the plaintiff have asked for? What remedies are
available in tort? What is the relation between tort and contract? Is
there any significance in the fact that the defendant is a doctor? What
if the facts were that the doctor was unlicensed? Or, instead of this case,
suppose what was involved was a car promised to have good brakes but
which actually had no brakes? What is the relation between public pol-
icy and private contract? Is there ever such a thing as an entirely "pri-
vate" contract?
which is missing is just as important is that which is present. The task of the instructor is thus
more difficult, but a lot more fun.
2 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957).
1967] 409
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Shaheen is followed by the famous Hawkins v. McGee' decision in
which the proper measure of damages in Contracts cases was discussed by
the court. The Hawkins case leads off the Fuller book, but it fits better
after a case such as Shaheen, since it may then be used to instruct the
students on what should have happened in that unfortunate litigation.
Hawkins evokes more intelligent discussion once the groundwork has
been laid by devoting time -to the questions raised by Shaheen. Freed-
man next includes a tort variation of Shaheen and follows it with a case
especially written to test some of the public policy aspects of Contracts.'
The first section of the book is thus cohesive and forms a solid founda-
tion for discussion of the whole area of Remedies, which is the next topic
in the book.
Remedies cannot totally be divorced from the public policies which
surround them and thus the doctrine of unconscionability as a limitation
on freedom of contract appears early. This introduces at the outset the
major theme of the regulation of fairness in dealing. But where does one
draw the line? Liquidated damage clauses and penalty clauses help lo-
cate the line drawing process and so they follow naturally. But what can
you put in a liquidated damage clause and what is the measure of the
recovery if such a clause was not written into the contract? The next
section on Remote and Speculative Damages takes up this question. The
limitation provided by the doctrine of mitigation of damages then appears
because analytically it is the next inquiry which occurs to the mind. Sev-
eral other sections add to the armory of legal and equitable remedies
available to the nondefaulting party. But what about a party, in default
himself, who sues to recover a benefit conferred? Freedman adds
several cases on this point because it logically follows after the remedies
of the nondefaulting party and because it serves as an introduction to the
law of restitution with which both contract and tort are intimately con-
nected.' A final section in this chapter serves to raise the problems of
personal service contracts and the remedies available against malicious
interference with contractual arrangements.'
3 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929).
4 The case ending this section was written as a hypothetical case, with several opinions, to
fill a gap in the materials. It raises questions of public policy in the context of illegality.
See Seavey & Scott, Restlitution, 54 L.Q. Rim. 29, 31-32 (1938).
6 At this point the inclusion of a case such as Schisgall v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 207
Misc. 224, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct. 1955), would serve as an excellent companion to the
case Freedman has chosen, Pure Oil Co. v. Dukes, 101 Ga. App. 786, 115 S.E.2d 449 (1960).
In Schisgall the court said that in a proper case, a malicious breach of contract would also con-
stitute a tort, especially where the plaintiff would have difficulty proving damages in contract.
The Pure Oil case forced an election on plaintiff where the breach of contract was also a tort,
independent of the contract. Plaintiff's complaint was held to be in contract and tort damage
claims were denied. These cases raise interesting questions on the problem of whether there
410 [Vol. 56: 407
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It is at this juncture that Freedman substantially parts company with
the other Contracts casebooks. The next chapter in the Freedman book
is Consideration. Analytically, this decision is correct. There is no rea-
son to revert back to offer and acceptance after dealing with remedies
except in order to return to a chronological presentation of the law. Af-
ter exploring the vagaries of remedies in Contracts, the next question to
arise is: well, what is a contract? It is true that offer and acceptance are
a part of a contract but they are more like preconditions for the existence
of the contract than equivalent to the contract itself. The heart of the
contract is consideration; or, what are the parties trying to do? The in-
troduction of materials on consideration immediately following materials
on remedies serves a very important pedagogical function. It allows the
student to see the types of bargains for which remedies will be awarded
or denied while the idea of remedy is still fresh in the student's mind.
Some casebooks which have accepted the Fuller innovation tend to treat
problems of Offer and Acceptance after the Remedies chapter.7 This is
a mistake. Cases on remedies naturally raise the question: what is it
which we are seeking to remedy and to what type of conduct will we deny
relief? To postpone the answer to these questions is to lose the impor-
tance of the first chapter. It may be argued that remedies will be denied
where the formalities of offer and acceptance are not complied with, and
no doubt this is true. But it misses the point. The Remedies chapter
raises what ultimately is a philosophical question: What promises are to
be enforced and why? The doctrine of Consideration is the answer given
by the common law to these questions!
No -treatment of Consideration is adequate without a voyage into the
vagaries of Estoppel, and the earlier the student gets this under his belt,
the sooner he will be able to understand part of the underlying rationale
of the law generally, no less Contract law specifically. In this chapter,
therefore, Freedman introduces the familiar promissory estoppel and equi-
table estoppel. In addition, however, and to the best of my knowledge
exists a remedy for a violated right, and what the nature of that remedy would be if one existed.
In N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936), included in the last chapter in Freedman's
book, Mr. Justice Cardozo says that the court will find a remedy where there has been a wrong.
These cases show that the answer is not that dear.
At this point one might also want to include the other side of the coin-a case involving
the wilful performance of a contract. See, eg., Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. Super. 278, 154
A.2d 625 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1959), in which a buyer, not able to convince the seller to let
him out of a contract for the purchase of a house, threatened to uphold the contract, buy the
house, and sell it to an undesirable person and thereby ruin the reputation of the seller-builder
and lower the value of the tract.
7 J. DAWSON & W. HARVEY, CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTS REMEDIS (1959); L. FULLER
& R. BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (1964).
8 See R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, ch. 6 (1922).
19671
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this is unique to American Contracts casebooks, Freedman includes ma-
terials on the English High Trees estoppel, which is considered to be one
of the most important innovations in Contract law for quite some time.'
Freedman then turns to the formalities of Contract law-the prob-
lems of formation. Included within this material is a separate section on
the problem of manifestation of assent through an agent. This may very
well be the student's only exposure to traditional agency problems since
the first year course in Agency has become like the platypus-virtually
extinct. The inclusion of several cases on agency is most beneficial for
introducing the student to this branch of the law as well as rounding out
the examination of problems of communication in a business environ-
ment.
Succeeding chapters deal with Conditions, Assignments, Third Party
Beneficiaries and Privity of Contract, Renegotiation of Contractual Obli-
gations, and Advising the Aggrieved Party on a Course of Action. The
last chapters bring the discussion back around to the ever important topic
of Remedy-the book has thus come full circle. One is tempted to sug-
gest that literature provides an example of a book coming full circle-
James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake. One is also tempted to suggest that the
comparison of the two books does not stop there, a fact to which student
affirmation is far from lacking.
One of the most important aspects of the Freedman book is its heavy
emphasis on the Uniform Commercial Code. Throughout the book, vir-
tually every section contains references to the Code and problems to be
solved under the Code. The case material is subjected to Code scrutiny
in class, and at least one major question on the Code appears on Freed-
man's Contracts exam. This great stress on the Code serves several func-
tions. In the first place, the Code is law in every state except Louisiana
9 See C. CHEsHIRE & C. FIFooT, THE LAW OF CoNTRACr 81-87 (6th ed. 1964); G.
TR L, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 84-87 (2d ed. 1966); Campbell, Gratuitous IWaiver of
Contractual Obligations, 1 N.Z.U.L. REv. 232 (1964); Turner, "High Trees House" Re.In-
spected-Promissory Estoppel in 1963, 1 N.Z.U.L. REV. 185 (1964). The name "High Trees"
comes from the case promulgating the rule, Central London Property Trust, Ltd. v. High Trees
House, Ltd., [1947] 1 KB. 130. Failure of the American casebooks to pick up this doctrine
is a highly significant omission since the High Trees estoppel represents the first major judi-
cial attempt to overhaul the doctrine of consideration. See Blackshield, Constitutionallsm and
Comstockery, 14 KANs. L REv. 403, 436 n.185 (1966); Denning, The Way of an Iconoclast,
3 Si)NEY L REV. 208 (1960); Denning, Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Considera-
tion, 15 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1952).
Estoppel material at this juncture also has the advantage of continuing one of the major
themes running through the Freedman book-the relationship between contract and tort. In
addition, the material emphasizes the fact that certain business actions can give rise to lawsuits
even though these actions are not strictly speaking ex contractu or ex delictu. The problem of
the appropriate remedy, dealt with in depth in the previous chapter, thus recurs here where the
problem is more sophisticated.
412 [Vol. 5 6: 407
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and is thus highly relevant for students from all parts of the country
(except Louisiana; but these students can see what they are missing). The
Code undoubtedly changes many Contracts principles by its express terms
and will change many more by implication and analogy." Second, the
introduction of a code to first year students serves as a method for sup-
plementing or comparing judicial case law reasoning. The student learns
how to think like a judge as well as a legislator and to appreciate the dif-
ference between these two reasoning processes." In addition, he learns
to work out problems under a code and compare this with problems
raised by case law. The systematic comparison of Code and case equips
the student with the full panoply of lawyer's tools for legal thinking.
Finally, the student is better able to handle higher level courses such as
Commercial Law, Sales, Secured Transactions, etc., which subject the
U.C.C. to intense and minute scrutiny. The student already familiar with
the Uniform Commercial Labyrinth will adapt to the commercial law
courses far more quickly and meaningfully than a student who has not
had the pleasure of a nodding acquaintance with that singular document.
Freedman includes an appendix containing 17 exam questions guar-
anteed to confound and confuse the hale and heartiest Contracts scholars.
The questions can be used on an exam (as Freedman does, but changing
the answers each year to avoid a "pat" answer developing), for study
group or review purposes, or in the classroom in a problem-method for-
mat.
Freedman's book, however, is not without its faults. The omission
of many aspects of Contracts law may deprive the book of popular ac-
ceptance. Similarly, by honing down the law, it has become a highly
personal book and may therefore not be sufficiently clear to Contracts
teachers who might plan to use it. The inclusion of a detailed teachers'
manual would go far towards suggesting the material to be brought out
in each case and the purpose behind the inclusion of that particular case
which was chosen.
Another objection is the lack of note material. A casebook should
not be a hornbook but it should furnish a guide to where the student
might look to improve his knowledge on certain points. A few citations
in each chapter to the better and more relevant material might save the
hapless first year student many miserable hours in the library not finding
10 See I. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULiK TRANSFERS ch. 4 (1966); Anderson,
Contracts Law in the Uniform Commercial Code (pts. 1-2), 1 ILL. CONT. LEG. EDuc 1, 65
(1963).
11 Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291.
1967] 413
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the enlightenment he so desperately seeks. Other types of note material
are also lacking.'2
One of the major criticisms is the woefully sparse material on the
Statute of Frauds. Professor Freedman has decided to include cases on
the Statute in the first chapter but the materials put together are not suf-
ficient even to convey the range of problems raised by the Statute, no less
suggest possible solutions. This section is perhaps the weakest in the
book and much in need of supplementation.
Professor Freedman has established himself as a leading authority in
the field of legal ethics. 3 One wishes that he had turned his situational
approach 4 to the law of Contracts and included a note dealing with the
ethical obligations, if any, of a lawyer who drafts adhesion contracts, uses
oppressive bargaining power wielded by his client to work a harsh bargain
or settlement on a "weak" businessman, and so on. In the conflict be-
tween public policy and private contract, surely the lawyer faces ethical
problems. One wishes that Professor Freedman had explored this area
with the same depth and perception that he has brought to bear on the
ethical problems of defense attorneys and of prosecutors. 5 Perhaps we
can hope to see such a note in a subsequent edition.'"
Minor, but annoying, points about the book include the fact that there
is no Table of Cases and no Index. It is true that the Table of Contents
lists the cases but this is no substitute for an alphabetical list of cases to
expedite research.
Ultimately, as was noted earlier, the great attraction, or downfall, of
the book lies in the conscious attempt by the author to strip down the
law of Contracts and work from the heart out to the flesh. This ap-
proach may be too "raw" for many who themselves prefer a fuller inclu-
2 The examination of communication problems in business would be substantially fur.
thered by the articles on business practices authored by Professor Stewart Macaulay. Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963);
Macaulay, The Use and Nonuse of Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry, 9 PRAC. LAW.,
Nov. 1963, at 13. At a minimum, there should be citations to Professor Macaulay's works so
that the student would at least be aware that they exist. Inclusion of excerpts from his works
would be a significant addition to the casebook.
13 See TIME, May 13, 1966, at 81.
14 Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 Gao. L.J.
1030, 1047 (1967).
15 Freedman, supra note 14; Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Dofonse
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
'6 Freedman includes a problem in the book designed to raise many of the ethical problems
involved in this area of the law. Because there is little material, if any, on ethics to which the
student is exposed throughout his law school career, more material here would be highly bene-
ficial. M. FREEDMAN, CASES ON CONTRACrS 84 (2d ed. 1967).
414 [Vol. 56: 407
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sion of materials. This matter of preference, coupled with the decision to
accept or reject the major themes Freedman stresses by his case selection,
is what helps the teacher determine whether or not to use the book. A
reviewer obviously cannot legislate preferences on the part of his audi-
ence, but, for whatever it is worth, I intend to use Freedman's new edition
of Cases on Contracts.
Alan W. Scheflin*
* B.A. 1963, University of Virginia; LL.B. 1966, George Washington; LL.M. 1967, Har-
vard; Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center.
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